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TRADE DISPUTES IN AN UNSETTLED INDUSTRY:
MEXICAN SUGAR
Kenneth Shwedel and Alejandro Ampudia1
INTRODUCTION
One of the outstanding trade disputes between Mexico and the
United States revolves around the market for sweeteners. This, of course,
should come as no surprise since around the world sugar is a highly politi-
cized commodity. In the Mexican/U.S. case the dispute moves beyond
sugar into the sweetener market involving high fructose corn syrup (HFCS).
The dispute is also wrapped in the last minute wheeling and dealing that
was necessary to get the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
approved by the U.S. Congress. It also brings into the dispute corn poli-
cies, which are important to both countries.2
In an attempt to put the trade dispute in perspective, this paper will
focus on the Mexican sugar industry. Two distinct groups, growers and
____________________
1  The opinions and conclusions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and not
necessarily Rabobank.
2 Corn, which is a stable in the Mexican diet, is the most widely grown crop in Mexico.
Only a small portion of the domestic crop, which is predominately white corn, goes
into animal feed and industrial use.  The importance of corn both for its impact on rural
incomes and consumption makes it a highly politicized crop in Mexico.349
mill owners characterize the industry. Historical circumstances and legal
issues have separated these two groups over time preventing the develop-
ment of an integrated sugar sector.  In fact, the relationship between these
two groups can be characterized as, at best, antagonistic.  At the same
time, the industry has been characterized by a series of policies and direct
government interventions that left the industry in a state of confusion and
disarray.
This paper has four sections:
• the first will review the troubled background and history of the
sugar industry through the first years of the NAFTA;
• the second section will look at the NAFTA agreement and subse-
quent disagreements regarding both sugar quota and the HFCS
dumping demand;
• the third section looks at recent events in the Mexican market,
including expropriation of approximately half of the production
capacity, Mexico’s acceptance of NAFTA, WTO panel findings
regarding the HFCS, and the subsequent decision to link the HFCS
imports to the level of duty free exports of sugar accepted by the
United States; and
• the final section discusses facing the future.
A TROUBLED BACKGROUND
To understand the industry, its politics and the trade disputes, it is
important to  recognize its importance both economically and socially within
Mexico. Sugar cane production tends to be is concentrated in the poor
tropical areas of Mexico. This concentration implies that policy decisions
have an important social impact in rural Mexico (Figure 1).  Sugar produc-
tion in Mexico is destined mostly for domestic consumption as opposed to
other countries that rely on the international market. Mexico has consumed
on average more than 85 percent of its production domestically. Major
Mexican industries, such as the soft drink industry, strongly rely on Mexi-
can sugar production (Figure 2). The Mexican sugar industry generates
0.7 percent of Mexico’s GDP, and some 400,000 direct jobs (in the fields)
and 700,000 indirect jobs, affecting between four and five million people
Shwedel and Ampudia350 Keeping the Borders Open
in Mexico. Therefore, the government has a strong commitment to this
industry for social and political reasons. This commitment has manifested
itself through a series of polices that have attempted to regulate the market
for the benefit of mill owners as well as to protect cane producers and mill
2,000,000  to 19,200,000   (5)
1,700,000  to  2,000,000   (2)
1,200,000  to  1,700,000   (5)
300,000  to  1,200,000   (3)
Less than 300,000 MT   (5)
Source: Rabobank from SAGARPA data
Figure 1: Sugar Cane Production is Concentrated in the Warmer
Areas of  Central Mexico.











workers. At times this commitment has led to direct management and ex-
propriation of the sugar mills.
Private Management and Government Intervention
Prior to 1970, Mexico’s sugar mills were essentially in private hands.
Production had been growing at rates even above that of the population. In
part this growth was a response to favorable prices and changes in the U.S.
sugar policy. Sugar production was stimulated during World War II by
high prices and again in the early 1960s after the United States canceled
Cuba’s sugar quota, which was distributed among a number of sugar pro-
ducing nations, including Mexico. The fact that the sugar mills were in
private hands did not mean that the government had left the sugar industry
to the forces of the market. Going back as far as the 1930s, the govern-
ment in conjunction with the private sector attempted to regulate the do-
mestic sugar market through the Comisión Estabilizadora del Mercado de
Azucar (Commission to Stabilize the Sugar Market). In 1943 Financiera
Industrial Azucarera, S.A. was created to finance the sugar industry. It
became the Financiera Nacional Azucarera (FINASA) in 1953, and in
1966 the Federal Government formally took control of FINASA in order to
assure that financing reached the industry at preferential rates.
The government’s control over the industry went beyond the mill-
ing and marketing of sugar into the production of sugar cane. Two legal
measures, which are still in effect today, contributed to the structural inef-
ficiencies that characterize the industry. In 1944 the government issued a
decree Decreto CaZero (Sugar Cane Growers Decree) that required farms,
whether they be ejido3 or private farms, that operated within the sugar
mills areas of influence to produce exclusively sugar cane. The decree, in
turn, required that the mills buy all the sugar cane produced in their area of
influence. This requirement assured a market for farmers’ cane and jobs
for rural laborers. As a result the area dedicated to sugar production almost
tripled.
____________________
3  The term ejido refers to a specific land tenure structure, whereby the use rights over a
tract of land is given to a group of farmers, ejidatarios, in perpetuity as long as they
continue to work the land.  They may work the land in individual units, as a co-
operative or in a collective-type scheme.
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The decree limits the mills’ ability to adjust purchasing to market
conditions. The decree also sets forth a pricing formula for the sugar cane.
One of the elements of the formula relates the price of sugar cane to the
previous year’s sugar prices. When sugar prices are rising, the formula is
favorable to millers since they pay last crop’s prices (lower) to cane grow-
ers. Likewise, when sugar prices are falling the millers pay above market
prices for sugar cane. Taken all together, the Decreto CaZero separates the
sugar industry from the market.
In addition to the Decreto CaZero, the government also imposed a
set of contractual obligations, the Contrato Ley, on the relations between
mill owners and their workers in the mill. Dating back to when mills were
located in relatively isolated areas, mill owners were required to provide
such services as housing, schooling, etc. for their workers and their fami-
lies. As a result the millers’ legal obligations to their workers were, and still
are, more rigorous than those of other industries that compete for financial
capital in Mexico. Even today when the government is able to provide
these services, and taxes companies for these purposes, the Contrato Ley
obliges the mills to continue providing these services.4
Although government programs impacted on the sugar industry at
several levels, essentially the policy objective was to assure a stable sup-
ply of sugar to consumers at affordable prices. In practical terms this meant
price controls at the consumer level while letting prices rise at the producer
level to stimulate sugar cane production.
The Government Take-Over of Mills (1970–1988)
Being squeezed at both ends, the sugar mills bordered on bank-
ruptcy. The government’s answer to this impending crisis was to rescue
the troubled mills, taking over the control through the Operadora Nacional
de Ingenios (ONISA). In 1971 when ONISA was formed the government
had control of 19 mills. By the end of the decade they controlled 49 of the
____________________
4  Mill owners charge that when the mills were under government control, the size of the
labor force was padded, which after privatization has made the Contrato Ley burden
even more onerous.353
66 mills in the country. To co-ordinate the sugar policy, the government
set up the Comisión Nacional de la Industria Azucarera (CNIA) in 1970.
Eventually CNIA took over ONISA’s functions.
Between 1970 and 1989, when the mills were under government
administration, sugar production grew from 2.2 million metric tons (mt) in
1970, to 3.49 million mt in 1989 . Most of this growth came from bringing
new land under cultivation. The sugar cane area increased by 35 percent
while average yields increased by only 7.7 percent.  At the same time the
number of sugar cane growers increased 56 percent. The disproportionate
relationship between the growth in the number of producers and sugar
cane area contributed to the contraction in the average size holding to only
4.1 hectares. In other words, sugar cane production is characterized by a
predominance of small scale agricultural units or minifundios. By 1990,
for example, only 5 percent of the sugar cane area was harvested mechani-
cally.5  Sugar mills did not fare much better under government control.
The number of workers increased 37 percent. Plant productivity increased
by only 5 percent.
Sugar consumption, helped by falling real prices, increased 103
percent. By the 1980s Mexico had gone from being a net exporter to being
a net importer of sugar. What kept the industry afloat during those years
were growing subsidies. Garcia Chavez (1996) calculates that between
1983 and 1990 government transfers to the sugar industry reached about
934 billion pesos. In fact, in 1988 subsidies to the sugar industry repre-
sented one quarter of the Secretary of Agriculture’s total budget, about
US$988 million.
Government Sale of the Mills (1988–1992)
During the de la Madrid Administration (1982–1988), Mexican
economic policy moved away from direct state control and intervention in
the economy toward favoring more  market orientation. Among the sec-
tors marked for a reduction in the government’s participation was the sugar
____________________
5  The low level of mechanization was also related to reluctance on the part of the
government to stimulate mechanical harvesting since it was seen as a labor displacing
technology.
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sector. Initially, the government had intended to reduce only its participa-
tion in the industry from around 75 percent to 50 percent. However, be-
cause of the recurrent economic crises and budgetary limitations, the gov-
ernment decided to withdraw completely from running sugar mills.
Selling the government’s interests in the sugar mills was easier said
than done. Potential buyers were aware of four problems inherent in the
acquisition of the sugar mills:
•  low levels of investment in technology;
•  difficult labor situations in the mills;
•  organizational problems with sugar cane producers; and
•  high dependence on government subsidies.
In response to these problems, the government designed schemes for pur-
chasing the mills that allowed for buyers to put up a small portion of the
purchase price6 at the time of sale, with concessions on the terms of the
remaining amount. In other words the mills were privatized in highly le-
veraged operations. Interestingly enough, a number of bottlers of carbon-
ated beverages purchased sugar mills during the privatization process,
vertically integrating an important part of Mexico’s beverage industry.
Even with these terms one could question the feasibility of the
business venture. It should be remembered that at that time imports of
sugar were tightly controlled. There was the implicit understanding that
imports would remain under tight controls to maintain domestic sugar prices.
This was not to be. Between 1989 and 1991 imports grew exponentially
reaching over one million metric tons.
Between 1990 and 1992, according to the Cámara Nacional de la
Industrial Azucarera y Alcoholera (National Sugar Chamber) net losses
for the milling industry reached 1.77 billion pesos. In 1991 the debt of the
privatized mills was restructured. In 1993 the government had to extend
credit to the mills on the order of 900 million pesos in order to liquidate the
debt that they had with sugar cane growers.
____________________
6  Some reports say that it was as low as 20 percent.355
As might be expected with the growing financial difficulties, a
number of mills changed hands after the privatization, creating increased
concentration in the industry. At the same time a number of companies
initiated programs to restructure production processes. As a consequence
the area planted in sugar cane increased concurrently, production yields
(tons of sugar cane per hectare) increased. At the same time, processing
yields (tons of sugar per tons of cane) in the mills  improved.
Going into 1994, the outlook for the sugar industry was mixed.
Any thoughts of optimism, however, disappeared at the end of the year.
While much has been made of the economic crisis in terms of the devalu-
ation of the peso and subsequent contraction of the economy, for the sugar
industry the rise in interest rates proved most damaging. Average interest
rates increased from 13.9 percent in 1994 to 48.6 percent in 1995. For the
already highly leveraged mills, this added debt burden was unsustainable.
FINA had to carry the debts on their books, about  $1.2 billion in 1996 and
$2.0 billion in 2001.
THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
Much has already been written about sugar and the NAFTA in-
cluding one paper prepared for the Sixth PDIC Workshop (Kennedy and
Petrolia, 2001). What stands out in the literature is that for what appears to
be a straightforward agreement, there is so much disagreement over what
was actually said and what was meant. In part, the disagreement may be
due to the negotiating objectives of the different parties. For Mexican ne-
gotiators, NAFTA was part of the policy of structural reform that character-
ized the de la Madrid and Salinas Administrations’ economic policy. In
fact, Mexican policy-makers and -negotiators saw NAFTA as a mecha-
nism that would keep structural reform policies in place beyond the nor-
mal six-year political cycle. For the U.S. and Canadian negotiators, by
way of contrast,  NAFTA was “one more” trade agreement. As such they
tended to respond more to the interests of their clientele (producers) than
did the Mexican negotiators.
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Likewise there were important differences in the way Mexico and
the United States approached the negotiations. Mexico saw and conse-
quently negotiated NAFTA in the limited terms of their domestic sugar
policy needs. The United States on the other hand, took a broader view,
focusing on sugar in the context of the wider sweetener market and policy.
In essence at the insistence of the United States, the original agreement
was rewritten at the last moment in the form of two side letters that rede-
fined the conditions for Mexico’s duty free access to the U.S. market, in-
corporating HFCS into the equation. The two main differences related to
the formula for determining Mexico’s status as a surplus producer and the
quota size for duty free sugar.
In the original agreement, Mexico was to be considered as a sur-
plus producer if domestic sugar production exceeded domestic consump-
tion of sugar for two consecutive years. As a surplus producer, Mexico
would have the right to export all surplus production into the U.S. market.
In response to concerns from U.S. producers, the side letters introduced
HFCS into the formula for calculating the surplus status.  After the ex-
change of the side letters, to be considered as a surplus producer, Mexico
domestic sugar production had to be greater than domestic consumption
of both sugar and HFCS.
For the United States this difference was crucial. Historically, the
United States has been a surplus producer of livestock feed corn, while it
has maintained a deficit position in the sweetener market. Both of these
markets have been the objective of government subsidies. The growth of
the HFCS industry appeared to take up part of the corn surplus while it
reduced the sweetener deficit. Yet the growth of HFCS posed the possibil-
ity of depressing the U.S. sweetener market. Maintaining exports of HFCS
is crucial to the U.S. sweetener policy.
An additional element of confusion and uncertainty comes from
what appears to be two different versions of the side letter. The English
version signed by the U.S. Trade Representative makes specific reference
to the “consumption” of HFCS, while the Spanish version, signed by the
Mexican Secretary of Commerce, says only that HFCS will be used for357
calculating net surplus. This discrepancy in wording leaves open the pos-
sibility for the Mexican production of HFCS to be included along with
domestic production of sugar.7
The other area of controversy relates to the quota for Mexican sugar.
According to the agreement, during years seven to fourteen of NAFTA,
the quota was raised from 150,000 mt to 250,000 mt.8 While this seems to
be rather straightforward, there have been differences on interpretation.
Mexico understands that this gives them access to 250,000 mt, i.e. they
can export duty free up to that level. The United States understands that
level to be the upside limit, i.e. Mexico does not automatically have access
to the entire 250,000 mt. Mexico called for a NAFTA panel to challenge
the U.S. interpretation and subsequent actions. In light of the controversy
that has ensued, it is interesting to reflect that in 1994 Mexico was a net
importer of sugar and that imports of HFCS were minimal.
The side letters have been subject to much controversy in Mexico.
In general the feeling in Mexico is that the baby was given away with the
bath water. At the same time the situation has left many Mexicans doubting
the commitment of the United States to free trade.
High Fructose Corn Syrup
In the United States there has been heavy investment in HFCS pro-
duction capacity. The main market for HFCS is for carbonated beverages.
The switch-over from sugar to HFCS in the United States was relatively
fast and easy since the carbonated beverage industry used liquefied sugar.
Not only was it used in the production of carbonated beverages, but it was
also transported and stored in liquid form. Yet even with the switch-over in
the carbonated beverage industry, the HFCS industry continued to face
excess capacity. Kennedy and Petrolia (2001, pp.239-240) pointed out
that increases in consumption of HFCS in the United States lagged behind
____________________
7  If this discrepancy were not enough, the Mexican Senate never officially approved
the side letter. This omission has allowed the Mexican government to argue that it
never agreed to the side letter. As such, it has no validity and does not supercede the
original agreement.
8  The quota for years one to seven remained unchanged.
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growth in production capacity. Mexico, which is the world’s second larg-
est consumer of carbonated beverages, was the logical market for the ex-
cess capacity (Figure 3). Exports from the United States of HFCS increased,
displacing sugar.9 Finally, in 1997 the Cámara Nacional de la Industrial
Azucarera y Alcoholera (National Sugar and Alcohol Chamber) formally
accused the U.S. industry of dumping HFCS in Mexico.
Following the formal investigation, the Mexican Commerce Secre-
tariat (SECOFI) ruled in favor of the Mexican sugar producers. SECOFI
found that dumping had occurred and that it had caused damage to the
Mexican sugar industry. Mexico imposed countervailing duties on imports
from those U.S. companies involved in exporting to Mexico. The response
from the United States was to ask for both a NAFTA panel and a WTO
dispute settlement panel. In all cases the panels have ruled against Mexico.
In spite of these panel rulings, Mexico had been able to put off reversing
the countervailing duties. After what was the final ruling in late 2001, Mexico
entered into negotiations with the United States looking to solve both the
____________________
9  Because of differences in flavor, the Mexican industry continued to use sugar along
with the HFCS, with some bottlers favoring a 50-50 formula of HFCS and sugar.






Source:  Rabobank with data from the Secretaria de Economia
Thousand Metric Tons
Imports of HFCS (55)
Figure 3: Mexico’s Imports of HFCS, 1994-2000.
Total Fructose Mexican Imports.
United      Other Total
States   Countries
1994 74,092 26 74,118
1995 57,758 1 57,759
1996 198,918 91 199,009
1997 347,799 3 347,802
1998 295,923 5 295,928
1999 344,910 1 344,911
2000 295,016  15,243 310,259359
differences on the interpretation of the side letters and the dumping resolu-
tion.
In a bungled attempt to resolve Mexican sugar producers’ prob-
lems, the SECOFI requested the soft drink industry to limit its use of HFCS.
Following the adverse reaction from the United States to the SECOFI press
release on the “request” to the soft drink industry, SECOFI denied that this
request had taken place.
Following the dumping resolution, imports of HFCS fell from
374,000 mt in 1999 to 283,000 mt in 2001. This drop,  however, does not
mean that the consumption of HFCS has fallen because domestic produc-
tion of HFCS has grown. In 2001, Mexican production of HFCS reached
350,000 mt. Only two companies are involved: Arancia Corn Products, a
joint venture with Corn Products International (CPI), produces 300,000
mt, and Almidones Mexicanos, a joint venture between ADM and Tate and
Lyle, produces the other 50,000 mt.
High-Tier Tariffs
While much of the attention and tension has focused on the dis-
pute surround the duty free tariffs (also known as the “low-tier tariffs”),
NAFTA also put into place a declining tariff schedule for sugar.10  “For
calendar year 2002 the raw sugar tariff is 9.07 cents a pound and the re-
fined sugar tariff is 9.61 cents a pound. The raw sugar tariff drops around
1.5 cents each year, and the refined sugar tariff drops about 1.6 cents a
year. Both rates reach zero in 2008.”11
The combination of low world sugar prices and the falling high-
tier tariff rates would suggest that Mexico would eventually find it profit-
able to redirect its sugar exports from the world market into the high-tier
U.S. market (Figure 4). USDA baseline data projections show a jump in
____________________
10  Besides sugar, NAFTA also incorporated a number of declining tariff schedules for




USDA, “USDA Baseline Projections,” February 2002, p.45.
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Mexican exports to the United States in 2003 taking advantage of the fall-
ing tariff rates.
WTO Commitment
The United States during the Uruguay Round, committed to im-
porting a minimum of 1.256 million mt of raw and refined sugar, raw
value.12 Of this amount at least 24,251 mt has to be refined sugar. This
commitment was rolled over into the WTO when it replaced GATT.
Mexico’s duty free exports of sugar to the United States have been
included in the U.S.’s WTO commitment. As indicated above, the quota
assigned to Mexico has been a source of trade friction. Into the future as
Mexico’s exports to the U.S. increase, they will take an increasingly larger
share of the WTO quota. The USDA baseline projections indicate that once
the U.S. market for Mexican sugar opens completely under NAFTA, ex-
ports will increase to the point where in 2011 they will equal the entire
WTO quota commitment.
____________________
12  This section is based on “USDA Baseline Projections,” February 2002, p.45.
Source: Rabobank from Fidiecomiso para el Mercado de Azucár (FORMA)  data.
Figure 4: Mexico Standard and Refined Historical Sugar Prices,
1997-2002.361
RECENT EVENTS
Following the government’s sale of the sugar mills and, in part, in
anticipation of access to the United States market, sugar production in-
creased in Mexico (Table 1). With consumption flat, increased production
moved the industry into a surplus position. Over time the already precari-
ous financial situation of the industry was worsened. The Mexican gov-
ernment was, and is still, very much involved in attempting to regulate the
sugar market, since many of the sugar mills continue to face serious finan-
cial problems, even with the countervailing duties on the HFCS.
The government has attempted to support the sugar industry by
keeping domestic prices above world prices, through limiting the amount
of sugar that is sold on the domestic market. The government does this by
estimating the domestic demand and the sugar harvest. Based on this in-
formation, the government assigns an export quota to the mills divided
into NAFTA duty free and NATFA non-duty free market components. The
mills are required to comply with the government assigned export quotas.
Essentially, therefore, Mexican sugar producers deal with three prices: the
U.S. price for the sugar exported under the NAFTA/sugar quota, the low
world price, and the Mexican price.
From Bankruptcy To Expropriation
In spite of the government’s attempts to support the domestic price,
the debt burden proved too much for many mills. In some cases, for ex-
ample, they raided pension funds. In others, they delayed payment to cane
growers. There have also been charges of fraud, with sugar that was said
to have been exported actually being sold on the domestic market. This
sugar had the effect of depressing domestic prices, further exacerbating
the worsening financial situation for some mills. In May 2000, GAM, the
second largest company in the industry filed for “suspension of payments,”
an equivalent to a Mexican Chapter 11. Although the company restruc-
tured and paid most of its short-term debt, it was unable to reach an agree-
ment regarding its long-term debt.
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Into 2001 the domestic market was in disarray. Due to the seasonal
nature of sugar prices,13 mills usually obtain sugar inventory financing
during the production period (November-August), and repay the loans
August-December each year. In 2001 however, after years of difficulties,
companies such as Escorpion (CAZE), Santos, Machado, and GAM were
negatively affected by their lack of short-term inventory financing. This
inability to monetize inventories pushed millers to accelerate sales of sugar
in order to obtain funds to cover operating expenses (mainly payments to
cane growers). By May 2001 standard sugar prices reached their lowest
level in the previous three years, impacting negatively on cash flow and
profits. The effect was felt throughout the entire industry. Sugar cane growers
demonstrated for payments, closing SAGARPA’s offices. The mill workers
were threatening to go on strike. Looking for a way out of the immediate
crises, the government implemented a program to finance inventories and
Table 1: Production and Consumption of Sugar in Mexico, 1991- 2002.
Period Production   Consumption  Surplus/ Consumption/  Exports/
  Deficit       Production  Production
1991/92 3,577 4,329 (752) 121% -17%
1992/93 4,431 4,459 (28) 101% -1%
1993/94 4,010 4,404 (394)       110% -9%
1994/95 4,650 4,397 253 95% 6%
1995/96 4,685 4,443 242 95% 5%
1996/97 4,822 4,100 722 85% 18%
1997/98 5,490 4,179 1,311 76% 31%
1998/99 5,147 4,160 987 81% 24%
1999/00 4,696 4,195 501 89% 12%
2000/01 4,924 4,500 424 91% 9%
2001/02 4,872 NA NA NA NA
Source: Fidiecomiso para el Mercado de Azucár (FORMA)
____________________
13  Seasonal movements of sugar prices in Mexico are characterized by three different
stages:
• January–May sugar prices drop as a result of an excess supply on the
market. This period corresponds to the main months of the sugar harvest.
• May–August sugar prices increase as the harvest winds down. This period
occurs when sugar producers usually would obtain financing for sugar
inventories; therefore supply is lower than demand and prices increase.
• August–December, when mills usually undergo maintenance. There is no
production, sugar prices increase, and demand grows at year’s end.363
to pay the sugar cane growers. In the short run, the crisis was diffused.
With the inventory financing implemented by the government for distressed
mills, standard sugar prices increased 28 percent between June and Au-
gust. This measure was effective and assisted not only distressed mills, but
also those mills with regular access to credit who were also affected by low
market prices.
With the new harvest just around the corner and no real solution in
sight, on September 3, 2001, the government expropriated 27 out of the
61 mills in the country. These mills represent approximately 55 percent of
the total sugar production. The mills belonged to four companies: GAM (6
mills), Escorpion (9 mills), Machado (4 mills), Santos (6 mills) and 2 inde-
pendent mills. Machado kept three of their seven mills. For the other com-
panies the expropriation represented their entire operations. After the ex-
propriation, the government established a special agency to manage and
eventually to sell the mills. They originally said that the mills will be priva-
tized within 18 to 24 months. Most analysts saw this time frame as highly
optimistic.  With mill owners challenging the expropriation in the country’s
courts it could be years before they exhaust their legal options, postponing
indefinitely the re-privatization of the mills.
Since the government’s expropriation of the 27 mills on Septem-
ber 2001, at least five fundamental factors are at work to the structure and
performance of the industry as follows.
Price Stability.  Immediately after the expropriation, prices in-
creased by 20 percent, and have remained stable through June 2002.  Al-
though in the first half of the year, sugar prices  were expected to drop
based on supplies generally being larger than demand, prices have re-
mained at attractive high levels. For instance, in May 2001 prices for a 50-
kg bag of standard sugar ranged from 175 to 180 pesos. In May 2002,
prices ranged from 230 to 240 pesos. Prices have remained at seasonably
high levels because the government now controls the milling groups that
had previously dumped sugar into the market to raise working capital. It is
clearly in the government’s best interest to have a stable, orderly and less
volatile sugar market to facilitate these sales and to maximize value.
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Controlled Exports And Domestic Sales. The government has
granted to an international trader a mandate to manage all sugar exports
(from the expropriated mills) both under NAFTA and into international
markets.  At the same time, the government and the private companies
have created a company to control all the exported sugar. Another interna-
tional trader has been granted a mandate to market all the domestic sugar
produced by the 27 expropriated mills.
Social Stability.  All cane growers at the expropriated mills are
being paid according to the industry payment terms. Full payment to cane
growers must be done by the end of July 2002 or according to terms spe-
cifically negotiated with each mill. The risk of previous years’ strikes or
warehouse blockages by unpaid cane growers has virtually been elimi-
nated.
Legal Structure.  The government continues to evaluate the law
that regulates payments to sugar cane growers and the labor law govern-
ing mill workers. Details have not been revealed, but changes are expected
to make the industry more competitive in the world market (which should
facilitate the privatization of the expropriated mills).
NAFTA.  Negotiations continue with the United States to resolve
disputes under NAFTA relating to Mexican sugar’s access to the United
States (currently limited to 125,000 metric tons). The new quota was not
announced in October.  Negotiations between the two countries continue.
In addition to the sugar quota and HFCS issue, the United States is said to
be looking for a commitment to restrict second-tier tariff  exports from
Mexico.
Seeking HFCS Solutions
In February 2002 the government announced its Política Nacional
Azucarera (National Sugar Policy) 2002–2006. It sets forth the policy ob-
jective of bringing about order in the market and modernizing the sugar
industry. To accomplish this objective, among other aspects, it talks about
export credit and credit facilities for inventory finance. It hints at revision
of the Contrato Ley. In addition, since the regulation of the supply of sugar365
on the domestic market was an essential element to their sugar program, as
part of the policy measures, the government announced the creation of a
sugar exporting company, owned jointly by the public and private sectors.
HFCS Tax
The HFCS tax was introduced as part of the reforms that the new
Fox Administration tried to put into place as a fiscal reform package. Over
the course of the year, the reform package got bogged down in Congress.
As the year came to an end, the Administration and the Congress faced a
deadline for the new budget. As part of the wheeling and dealing that
characterized the final days of 2001- -with Congress flexing its muscle- -a
special tax on the use of HFCS for soft drinks was passed. As a result, all
soft drink bottlers quickly eliminated  HFCS from their recipes and con-
verted to all-sugar formulas. This conversion is expected to increase do-
mestic consumption by 400,000 mt per year.
The tax initiative did not begin with the Administration, rather it
came from Congressmen related to the sugar growers union. They were
dissatisfied with the Administration’s apparent willingness to negotiate a
settlement to the HFCS dumping case. Interestingly enough, the reaction
from the United States appeared to blame the Administration for the spe-
cial tax, accusing the government of going back on its word when they
agreed to negotiations on the HFCS issue. Besides the pressure from the
U.S. government, the Administration is also under pressure from the com-
panies producing HFCS in Mexico.
Caught between a rock and a hard place, the Administration tem-
porarily suspended the HFCS tax in March 2002.14  Subsequently in July
2002, the Mexican Supreme Court declared the suspension unconstitu-
tional.  Nevertheless, even before the Supreme Court ruling, bottlers were
not expected to switch back to HFCS in the interim given the short-term
nature of the moratorium and the uncertainties surrounding this tax. The
temporary suspension ran through September 30, 2002, reflecting a bal-
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15  In conversations with one of the authors, representatives of the USDA/ERS said that
this was not their intention. Nevertheless, a high official at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico
said that the United States would not hesitate to initiate a dumping demand if they
thought that high-tier imports would damage the U.S. sugar industry.
ancing act among the different interest groups, and the government’s ex-
pectations to have reached an agreement with the U.S. on the HFCS and
sugar quota issues by that date. That is the end of the U.S. government’s
fiscal year.
In April the government decided to formally recognize the NAFTA
panel and a WTO dispute settlement panel ruling, eliminating the
countervailing duties on HFCS.  In an attempt to link the HFCS and NAFTA
sugar quota issues, the Mexican government set a duty free quota of 148,000
mt for HFCS, applying a 210 percent tariff on imports of HFCS over the
duty free quota amount. This amount is equal to the quantity of duty-free
Mexican sugar allowed into the United States.
FACING THE FUTURE
It is clear that the recent expropriation gives the government a one-
time opportunity to comprehensively restructure the sugar industry, in-
cluding the level of inventories, price, the Decreto CaZero, Contrato Ley,
and industrial rationalization. However, part of the future of the sugar in-
dustry will also depend on the trade situation and negotiations under NAFTA.
Within the Mexican sugar industry there are those who doubt that in 2008
the United States will allow for the free entry of Mexican sugar, or, for that
matter, any other country’s sugar cane sugar, into the U.S. market. The
USDA in their baseline projections apparently sets the stage for a chal-
lenge to Mexican sugar imports, especially the high-tier imports. Stating
that production costs of Mexican sugar are higher than world prices, they
raise the possibility that to export competitively to the United States under
the high-tier quotas, Mexican exports would have to involve dumping prac-
tices.15367
If the U.S. were to allow free and unlimited access of Mexican
sugar two basic scenarios emerge. Under the first scenario, the United
States would abandon their sugar support program. Access to the U.S.
market would stimulate Mexican production, the result of both Mexican
and foreign investment. With Mexican sugar production more efficient than
U.S. sugar cane or beet production, the price of sugar from Mexico would
be more attractive. Prices on the U.S. market, while still above world prices,
would be depressed, driving beet producers out of the market. At some
point, U.S. policy makers would come to realize that the sugar program
resulted in a transfer payment to Mexican producers. Once the United States
abandoned their sugar program they would be willing to open the market.
An open market would drive down prices to world levels to the detriment
of those Mexican sugar producers who are unable to compete at interna-
tional price levels.
This scenario is not seen as highly probable. The political costs on
both sides of the border in both countries would be high, and it is doubtful
as to whether policy makers would have the will to confront the social
consequences. A variant of this scenario has the United States adapting
mechanisms akin to those incorporated into the new Farm Bill for pea-
nuts.16 This approach would allow the opening of the border while provid-
ing income support to U.S. beet and cane growers. To the extent that this
policy framework  drove down prices in the U.S. market, it would also
work against those Mexican sugar producers who are unable to compete at
international price levels. Needless to say, this outcome would lead to fur-
ther trade disputes between the two countries.
More likely is the second scenario. As Mexican exports to the U.S.
market grow, the United States would adjust its quota program to continue
protecting the U.S. market. A basic assumption here is that the United
States is willing to abandon the sugar quota as an instrument of foreign
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16  In the case of peanuts the new Farm Bill does away with the production quota,
offering growers two different “buy out options,” and establishes an acreage base for
subsequent support. These changes bring the new peanut program in line with other
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policy. What would emerge is a common North American sweetener mar-
ket. HFCS would flow south and sugar would flow north.17 There are al-
ready companies considering investment strategies based on this scenario.
With the second scenario considered more probable, what hap-
pens over the next five years will determine where the market goes. With
most of the attention, due obviously to the trade disputes, focused on the
duty free exports, it is easy to forget that NAFTA calls for over-the-quota
tariffs on Mexican sugar. Estimates are that with the reduced tariffs this
year, exports to the United States are near the break-even point with ex-
ports to the world market. Next year the United States will become a more
attractive alternative to the world market. This situation suggests that Mexi-
can exports to the U.S. market will grow significantly over the next five
years, and the over-the-quota tariff rate falls. The United States may be
pushed to a policy decision even before 2008.
The Spoilers
As we look ahead, two issues stand out. The first is post-Castro
Cuba. The obvious question is how will the United States treat Cuban sugar?
Before the suspension of imports of Cuban sugar in 1960, Cuba was a
favored source of sugar for the United States receiving 72 percent of the
total U.S. import quota with a tariff rate 20 percent lower than that faced by
other exporters.18   By the late 1950s Cuba accounted for “about 35 percent
of U.S. annual domestic consumption.”19 There is no reason to believe
that in a post-Castro Cuba, especially one that has come to terms with the
Cuban refugee population living in the United States, there will not be a
move to extend favorable access for Cuban sugar to the U.S. market.  Any
____________________
17
  Significant growth is not seen in the demand for HFCS in the U.S. market since it is
already used extensively for sweetening carbonated beverages. The physical and orga-
noleptic properties of HFSC suggest that there are limited options for its use as a
sweetener for other food products. Sugar remains the sweetener of choice.
18  Boughner, D.S., and Coleman, J.R. (2002). “Normalizing Trade Relations with Cuba:
GATT-compliant Options for the Allocation of the U.S. Sugar Tariff-rate Quota.” The
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy 3, 1: p.48. Downloaded
from www.esteyjournal.com.
19  Ibid. p. 48.369
favorable treatment for Cuba would reduce Mexican participation in the
U.S. sugar market.20
The second issue relates to the Free Trade of the Americas initia-
tive. As this initiative moves forward it is safe to assume that the negotia-
tions will look to the NAFTA as a model, suggesting that some time into
the future there will be a regional sweetener market. Right now, neither the
Mexican nor the U.S. industries are competitive with those of other coun-
tries in the Americas’ region.
For the United States one could predict the end of domestic sugar
production. For Mexico the longer it takes for the regional market to come
about, the more time it will have to develop and to restructure its industry.
The real question is will Mexico take the hard decisions needed to turn its
sugar industry into a world class competitive sugar producer?
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